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Abstract
We consider a group of m trusted and authenticated nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K over a wireless
channel in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. We assume that there exists a state dependent wireless broadcast
channel from one of the honest nodes to the rest of them including Eve. All of the trusted nodes can also discuss
over a cost-free, noiseless and unlimited rate public channel which is also overheard by Eve. For this setup, we
develop an information-theoretically secure secret key agreement protocol. We show the optimality of this protocol
for “linear deterministic” wireless broadcast channels. This model generalizes the packet erasure model studied in
literature for wireless broadcast channels. For “state-dependent Gaussian” wireless broadcast channels, we propose
an achievability scheme based on a multi-layer wiretap code. Finding the best achievable secret key generation rate
leads to solving a non-convex power allocation problem. We show that using a dynamic programming algorithm, one
can obtain the best power allocation for this problem. Moreover, we prove the optimality of the proposed achievability
scheme for the regime of high-SNR and large-dynamic range over the channel states in the (generalized) degrees
of freedom sense.
Keywords
Secret key sharing, multi-terminal secrecy, information theoretical secrecy, wireless channel, public discussion.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of generating a secret key K among m ≥ 2 honest (trusted and authenticated) nodes that
communicate over a wireless channel in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. We restrict our attention to the
case where communication occurs either through a broadcast channel, where the received symbols are independent
among all receivers of the broadcast transmissions including Eve (given that the transmitted symbols is known),
or, through a no-cost noiseless public channel.
Here, we focus on the group secret key agreement over a state-dependent Gaussian broadcast channel. This
model can be motivated by fading wireless channels, where the channel states vary over time; i.e., the variation of
SNR1 level is modeled by the state of the channel. The use of state-dependent channels for secrecy has been of
interest recently (see for example [1] and references therein). To gain insight into our problem, we first investigate
a deterministic approximation of the wireless channel as introduced in [2].
For the deterministic broadcast channel we will show that using a superposition based secrecy scheme [3], we
can develop a group key agreement protocol that can be shown to be information-theoretically optimal. This can be
done by converting the deterministic channel to multiple independent erasure channels. In particular, we show that
we can get the same key agreement rate for the entire group as we would get for a single pair of nodes. Therefore
this result demonstrates that in the presence of an unlimited public channel, we get secret key-agreement rates for
linear deterministic channels, that is invariant to network size. Similar to the case of erasure broadcast channel
[4], a key idea to get this is a connection to network coding (NC), which allows efficient (in the block length)
reconciliation of the group secret (also refer to Appendix A for a review of our previous results on the group secret
key agreement over erasure broadcast channels).
We use the deterministic achievability scheme to get some insight about the Gaussian wireless broadcast channel
with state. To this end, we use a multi-layer (nested message set, degraded channel) wiretap code based on the
This work was funded in part by NSF grant 1321120.
1Signal to noise ratio.
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2broadcast approach of [3], [5] to develop a key-agreement protocol for the noisy broadcast problem. This enables
a scheme that converts the wireless channel with state to behave similar to the deterministic case. As a result, we
show that the achievable secret key generation rate is given by a non-convex optimization problem that determines
the power allocation over different layers of the wiretap code.
Although the power allocation optimization problem is non-convex, by investigating and exploiting its special
structure, we provide a dynamic programming based algorithm that finds the optimal solution to this optimization
problem. The final solution is hard to be written in a closed form expression for the general case. However, the
output of our algorithm should not be considered as a numerical approximation but an exact solution. The devised
algorithm enables us to evaluate the performance of the proposed group secret key-agreement protocol for various
situations.
Finally, we derive an upper bound on the secrecy rate and compare it with the achievable rate by the proposed
scheme. Furthermore, we show that although the proposed achievability scheme is not optimal, it can be proved that
for the high-SNR regime when there is a large-dynamic range between the channel states, this scheme is optimal
in the (generalized) degrees of freedom sense.
A. Related Work
Secret key generation over wireless channels is a problem that has attracted significant interest. In a seminal paper
on “wiretap” channels, Wyner [6] pioneered the notion that one can establish information-theoretic secrecy between
Alice and Bob by utilizing the noisy broadcast nature of wireless transmissions. However, his scheme works only
if we have perfect knowledge of Eve’s channel and moreover, only if Eve has a worse channel than Bob. In a
subsequent seminal work, Maurer [7] showed the value of feedback from Bob to Alice, even if Eve hears all the
feedback transmissions (i.e., the feedback channel is public). He showed that even if the channel from Alice to Eve
is better than that to Bob, feedback allows Alice and Bob to create a key which is information-theoretically secure
from Eve. The problem of key agreement between a set of terminals having access to a noisy broadcast channel
and a public discussion channel (visible to the eavesdropper) was studied in [8], where the secret key generation
capacity is completely characterized, assuming Eve does not have access to the noisy broadcast transmissions. The
case when the eavesdropper also had access to the broadcast channel was the main focus of recent work in [9],
[10] which developed upper and lower bounds for secrecy rates. If the trusted nodes have access to a multi-terminal
channel instead of a broadcast channel, [11] and [12], independently, derived upper and lower bounds for secret
key generation capacity under the assumption that Eve has only access to the public channel.
The best achievable secrecy rate by our scheme for the Gaussian state-dependent channel is given by a non-
convex optimization problem (see (20)) which can be reformulated as a generalize linear fractional program [13].
In [14], the weighted throughput maximization problem have been studied which involves a similar optimization
problem to (20) and the authors employs numerical techniques introduced in [13] to solve this problem. In our
case, however, the convergence time of such numerical method is not practical and we have to develop an approach
in Section VII to solve optimization problem (20) analytically.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to consider multi-terminal secret key agreement over erasure
networks and wireless broadcast channels with state, when Eve also has access to the noisy broadcast transmissions.
Moreover, unlike the information-theoretic works (e.g., [6], [7], [15], [8], [10]) that assume infinite complexity
operations, our schemes for the deterministic broadcast channels (that includes the erasure channel case [4]) are
computationally efficient. It is worth mentioning that following a conference version of this work on the packet
erasure channel [4], there has been some attempts to bring those ideas to practical scenarios, e.g., [16], [17], [18],
[19].
The main contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• For the secret key sharing problem among m trusted nodes that have access to a deterministic broadcast channel
and to a public discussion channel, we completely characterize the secret key generation capacity. This result
can be considered an extension to the erasure channel case [4] and produces information theoretic secure key
regardless of the computational power of the eavesdropper Eve.
• By using ideas from the code design for deterministic broadcast channels, we devise a coding scheme based on
a nested message set, degraded channel wiretap code (also see [3]). In general, we characterize the achievable
secret key generation rate which is given by a non-convex power allocation optimization problem. Moreover,
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Fig. 1: (a) The broadcast channel that Alice (terminal T0) has access to. (b) The cost-free noiseless public channel
that all of the trusted node can discuss over. Eve overhears all of the public discussions completely.
we derive an upper bound on the secrecy rate and show that for the high-SNR, high-dynamic range regime,
our proposed scheme is optimal in a degree of freedom sense.
• Although, in the proposed scheme, the best achievable secrecy rate is described by the solution of a non-convex
optimization problem, we solve the optimization problem by using dynamic programming technique.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce our notation and the problem formulation.
Section III summarizes the main results of the paper. Our general upper bound on the secret key generation capacity
for an independent broadcast channel is presented in Section IV. Each of the “deterministic,” and “state-dependent
Gaussian” models will be discussed in Section V and Section VI, respectively. The solution of the non-convex
optimization problem is derived in Section VII. Finally, open questions and future directions will be discussed in
Section VIII.
II. NOTATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
For convenience, during the paper, we use [i : j] to denote the set of integers {i, i + 1, . . . , j}. Given random
variables X1, . . . , Xm, we write X1:m to denote (X1, . . . , Xm). We use also Xt to denote (X[1], . . . , X[t]) where
t is the discreet time index. With an abuse of the notation, we use H(·) to denote both entropy and differential
entropy depending on the context. All the logarithms are in base two unless otherwise stated. We write f(x) ·= g(x)
to denote that log f(x) = log g(x) + o(log x). The notation “
·≤” and “ ·≥” are defined similarly.
A. Problem Statement
We consider a set of m ≥ 2 honest nodes {0, . . . ,m − 1} that aim to share a secret key K among themselves
while keeping it concealed from a passive adversary Eve, denoted by “E”. Eve does not perform any transmissions,
but is trying to eavesdrop on (overhear) the communications between the honest nodes2.
We assume that Alice (terminal 0) has access to a broadcast channel such that the rest of the terminals (including
Eve) receive independent noisy version of what she broadcasts (see Figure 1a), where the input and output symbols
of the channel are from some arbitrary sets. We also assume that all of the honest terminals can discuss over a
cost-free noiseless public channel where everybody (including Eve) can hear the discussion (see Figure 1b).
The protocol stated in Definition 1 introduces the most general form of an interactive communication between
terminals aiming to share a common secret key K (see also [7], [15], [8], [10]).
2For convenience, sometimes we will refer to legitimate terminals 0, 1, 2, . . . , as “Alice,” “Bob,” “Calvin,” and so on. So for example, we
use X0, X1, X2, etc. interchangeably with XA, XB, XC, etc.
4Definition 1 (Secret key generating protocol).
1) For t = 0, all of the honest terminals generate independent random variables Q0, . . . , Qm−1.
2) (i) For time 1 ≤ t ≤ n, Alice transmits X0[t] over the broadcast channel. Then the other terminals receive
X1[t], . . . , Xm−1[t], and Eve receives XE[t].
(ii) Following each of the broadcast transmissions, there is the possibility for the legitimate terminals to discuss
over a cost-free noiseless public channel. The discussion continues in a round robin order for an arbitrary number
of rounds. The whole public discussion at time t is denoted by D[t]. Notice that what Alice broadcasts at time t
depends on Q0 and Dt−1.
3) Finally, the ith terminal creates a key Ki where Ki = Ki(Qi, Xni , D
n).
Definition 2. A number Rs is called an achievable key generation rate if for every  > 0 and sufficiently large n
there exists a key generating protocol as defined in Definition 1 such that we have
P [Ki 6= Kj ] < , ∀i, j : i 6= j, (1)
I(K0;X
n
E , D
n) < , (2)
1
n
H(K0) > Rs − . (3)
The supremum of the achievable key rate as n→∞ and → 0 is called the secret key generation (SKG) capacity
Cs.
B. State-Dependent Gaussian Broadcast Channels
Here, we introduce the state-dependent additive white Gaussian broadcast channel model which is the main focus
of this paper. In this model, we assume that for each receiver the channel state remains unchanged during a block
of symbols of length L and changes independently from one block to another block. We also assume L is large
enough so that enables us to apply information theoretical arguments within each block. The transmitted vector
sent by Alice is denoted by XA ∈ RL. The received vector at each receiver (including Eve) depend on its channel
state at a particular time instant. We define a random variable Si[t] ∈ [0 : s] corresponding to the channel state for
the ith terminal at time t and similarly define the random variable SE[t] ∈ [0 : s] for Eve. For the channel state of a
receiver r ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1,E} we assume that3 P [Sr[t] = k] = δk,∀k ∈ [0 : s], where
∑s
k=0 δk = 1. The received
vector at the receiver r is modelled by a state-dependent white Gaussian channel as follows
Xˆr[t] =
√
hSr[t]XA[t] + Zr[t], ∀r ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1,E}, (4)
where Xˆr[t] ∈ RL and Zr[t] ∈ RL . For the additive noise of each receiver we assume Zr[t] ∼ N(0, IL) and the
noise vectors are also independent over time. The channel gains
√
hi are some real constants such that h0 < · · · < hs.
Additionally, the channel input is subject to an average power constraint Pmax, i.e., 1LE
[‖XA‖2] ≤ Pmax.
Moreover, we assume that the CSI4 is completely known by each receiver. So we define a composite received
vector for each receiver r as Xr[t] = (Xˆr[t], Sr[t]).
C. Deterministic Broadcast Channel
Now, following the idea proposed in [2], we introduce the deterministic approximation model for our Gaussian
channel. We assume that the transmitted vector (packet) sent by Alice is denoted by XA ∈ FLq where Fq is a finite
field of size q. Then, the received vector at the receiver r is modelled by a state-dependent deterministic broadcast
channel as follows
Xˆr[t] = F Sr[t]XA[t], ∀r ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1,E}, (5)
where F i ∈ FL×Lq for i ∈ [0 : s] and Sr[t] is defined in Section II-B. Moreover, similar to the Gaussian model, we
define a composite received vector for the receiver r as Xr[t] = (Xˆr[t], Sr[t]).
3For simplicity of demonstration and without loss of generality, here we only consider a symmetric problem where the probability
distribution over the states are the same for all of the receivers (including Eve). Moreover, we focus on a finite number of states. Both of
these restrictions can be relaxed.
4Channel state information.
5In order to capture and model the different SNR level for the Gaussian channel, we use the shift matrix model
developed in [2]. To this end, we consider matrices F i such that they satisfy the following nested structure
~0 = kerF s ⊂ kerF s−1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ kerF 0 = FLq , (6)
rank(F i − F i−1) = rank(F i)− rank(F i−1). (7)
For convenience we assume that F s = IL where IL is the identity matrix of size L. The two extreme states
“0” and “s” correspond to complete erasure and complete reception of the transmitted vector (packet) XA. The
deterministic model is indeed an extension to the packet erasure broadcast channel, studied in [4], [19], which has
only two channel states, i.e., s = 1, (see also Appendix A).
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main results of this paper is summarized in the following. For the secret key generation scenario among m
terminals that have access to a “deterministic broadcast channel,” we completely characterize the key generation
capacity. This result can be considered as the generalization of the result of [4], [19] for “packet erasure broadcast
channels” (see Theorem 1). For a “state-dependent Gaussian broadcast channel,” we provide upper and lower bounds
for the key generation capacity and show that these bounds will match in the high-dynamic range, high-SNR regime.
Furthermore, the achievable secrecy rate by our proposed scheme for the Gaussian model is described by a non-
convex power optimization problem. Although this problem is non-convex, by exploiting its special structure, we
find the optimal power allocation that leads to the best secrecy rate achievable by the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1. The SKG capacity among m terminals that have access to a state-dependent deterministic broadcast
channel, defined in Section II-C, is given by
Cdets =
s∑
i=1
[rankF i − rankF i−1] θi(1− θi) log q,
where θi ,
∑i−1
j=0 δj .
This theorem is proved in Section V. Notice that the result of [4] is a special case of Theorem 1 when s = 1.
Theorem 2. The SKG capacity among m terminals that have access to a state-dependent Gaussian broadcast
channel, as defined in Section II-B, is upper bounded by
Cgauss ≤
1
2
L
s∑
i=0
s∑
j=0
δiδj log
(
1 +
hiPmax
1 + hjPmax
)
.
Moreover, the secrecy capacity can be lower bounded by the solution of the following (non-convex) optimization
problem
Cgauss ≥

max
∑s
i=1 ∆iLRi
subject to
∑s
i=1 Pi = Pmax
Pi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [1 : s],
where ∆i , (1− θi)θi. Also ∀i ∈ [1 : s] we have
Ri ,
1
2
[
log
(
1 +
hiPi
1 + hiIi
)
− log
(
1 +
hi−1Pi
1 + hi−1Ii
)]
,
where Ii ,
∑s
j=i+1 Pj . Additionally, for the high-dynamic range case where hi  hi−1, ∀i ∈ [1 : s], and when we
are in high SNR regime, we can write
Cgauss
·
=
1
2
L
s∑
i=1
∆i log
hi
hi−1
,
where “ ·=” defined in Section II, is used to denote for the exponential equality with respect to some scaling
parameter Q. Here, as Q → ∞, we asymptotically approach to the high-dynamic, high-SNR regime (for more
details refer to Section VII-A).
6It is worth mentioning that the power optimization problem stated in Theorem 2 is a non-convex problem.
Although the closed-form solution of the this problem is not easy to derive explicitly, but by using dynamic
programming it can be easily found numerically. In Section VII, based on the structure of this optimization problem
and by exploiting special properties of its KKT necessary conditions for the optimality, we propose a dynamic
programming algorithm that finds the optimal power allocation (see Algorithms 1 and 2). More specifically, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Algorithms 1 and 2 find the optimal solution of the optimization problem stated in Theorem 2.
IV. UPPER BOUND FOR THE KEY GENERATION CAPACITY OF INDEPENDENT BROADCAST CHANNELS
The secret key generation capacity among multiple terminals (without eavesdropper having access to the broadcast
channel) is completely characterized in [8]. By using this result, it is possible to state an upper bound for the
secrecy capacity of the key generation problem among multiple terminals where the eavesdropper has also access
to the broadcast channel. This can be done by adding a dummy terminal to the first problem and giving all the
eavesdropper’s information to this dummy node and let it to participate in the key generation protocol. By doing
so, the secret key generation rate does not decrease. Hence by combining [8, Theorem 4.1] and [8, Lemma 5.1],
the following result can be stated.
Theorem 4. The secret key generation capacity among m terminals as defined in Definition 2, is upper bounded
as follows
Cs ≤ max
PX0
min
λ∈Λ([0:m−1])
[
H(X[0:m−1]|XE)−
∑
B([0:m−1]
λBH(XB|XBc , XE)
]
,
where Λ([0 : m − 1]) is the set of all collections λ = {λB : B ( [0 : m− 1], B 6= ∅} of weights 0 ≤ λB ≤ 1,
satisfying ∑
B([0:m−1], i∈B
λB = 1, ∀i ∈ [0 : m− 1]. (8)
In the above expression for the upper bound, it is possible to change the order of maximization and minimization,
see [8, Theorem 4.1].
Remark 1. The upper bound stated in Theorem 4 is not the best known upper bound for the secret key sharing
capacity of the multi-terminal secret key sharing problem (see also [9], [10] for alternative improved bounds).
However in this work, we use Theorem 4 to derive an upper bound for our problem. This bound is good enough
that in addition to the proposed achievability scheme, completely characterize the secret key sharing capacity for
the “state-dependent deterministic channels” scenario.
Now, back to our problem where the channel from Alice to the other terminals are assumed to be independent,
we can further simplify the upper bound given in Theorem 4, as stated in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 (See also [4]). If the channels from Alice to the other terminals are independent, then the upper bound
stated in Theorem 4 for the SKG capacity is simplified to
Cs ≤ max
PX0
min
j∈[1:m−1]
I(X0;Xj |XE) (9)
≤ min
j∈[1:m−1]
max
PX0
I(X0;Xj |XE). (10)
Proof: For the proof refer to Appendix B.
Remark 2. Using [7, Theorem 7] or [15, Theorem 2], we observe that the bound given in (10) is indeed tight
for the two terminals problem where we have the Markov chains XB ↔ XA ↔ XE, i.e., when the channels are
independent or XA ↔ XB ↔ XE, i.e., when the channels are degraded. In Section V, we will further show that
the above upper bound is also tight for the stated-dependent deterministic broadcast channels.
7V. GROUP SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER DETERMINISTIC BROADCAST CHANNELS
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 that characterizes the secret key generation capacity for a deterministic
broadcast channel defined in Section II-C. The proof of this theorem, as an underlying machinery, uses the
achievability technique for the packet erasure broadcast channel that is appeared in [4], [19] (for more details,
also see Appendix A).
A. Upper Bound for the Key Generation Capacity
Using Theorem 5, the SKG capacity Cdets for the independent broadcast channel can be upper bounded by (10).
Then we have the following result, Theorem 6.
Theorem 6. The SKG capacity of the deterministic broadcast channel, introduced in Section II-C, is upper bounded
by
Cdets ≤
s∑
i=1
[rankF i − rankF i−1] θi(1− θi) log q,
where θi =
∑i−1
j=0 δj .
Proof: From (10) and because of the symmetry of the problem, we have Cdets ≤ maxPXA I(XA;XB|XE) where
we use “A” and “B” to denote for terminal 0 and terminal 1. Then, we can write
H(XA|XE) =
s−1∑
i=0
δi
[
H(XA|XˆE, SE = i)
]
=
s−1∑
i=0
δi
[
H(XA, XˆE|SE = i)−H(XˆE|SE = i)
]
=
s−1∑
i=0
δi [H(XA)−H(F iXA)] ,
and similarly
H(XA|XB, XE) =
s−1∑
i=0
κi [H(XA)−H(F iXA)] ,
where κi , 2δi(δ0 + · · ·+δi−1)1{i>0}+δ2i . Thus, we have I(XA;XB|XE) =
∑s−1
i=0 ρi [H(XA)−H(F iXA)] where
ρi , δi−κi. Now, by observing that H(F iXA) = H(F iXA,F i−1XA) and applying the chain rule recursively, we
get H(F iXA) =
∑i
j=1H(F jXA|F j−1XA). So I(XA;XB|XE) can be expanded as follows
I(XA;XB|XE) =
s−1∑
i=0
ρi[H(XA)−H(F iXA)]
=
s∑
j=1
H(F jXA|F j−1XA)
j−1∑
i=0
ρi.
Hence we can upper bound Cdets as follows
Cdets ≤ max
PXA
s∑
j=1
H(F jXA|F j−1XA)
j−1∑
i=0
ρi
= max
PXA
s∑
j=1
H ([F j − F j−1]XA|F j−1XA)
j−1∑
i=0
ρi
(a)
≤ max
PXA
s∑
j=1
H ([F j − F j−1]XA)
j−1∑
i=0
ρi
8kerF 0 = FLq
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Fig. 2: Demonstration of Proposition 1. Here, we have ~0 = kerF s ⊂ kerF s−1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ kerF 0 = FLq and
Π1, . . . ,Πs satisfy (12).
(b)
=
s∑
j=1
rank (F j − F j−1)
(
j−1∑
i=0
ρi
)
log q
(c)
=
s∑
j=1
[rankF j − rankF j−1]
(
j−1∑
i=0
ρi
)
log q, (11)
where (a) is true because conditioning reduces the entropy, (b) is true because uniform distribution on XA achieves
the maximum values for all the entropies in the summation, and finally (c) is true because of the assumption we
have made in (7). Also, note that
∑j−1
i=0 ρi = θj(1− θj) ≥ 0, where θj ,
∑j−1
i=0 δi. This completes the proof.
B. Lower Bound for the Key Generation Capacity
In this section, we will present a scheme that achieves the same secret key generation rate as we derived in the
upper bound stated in Theorem 6. But before that, let us state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose s subspaces kerF i ⊆ FLq satisfy the nested condition (6), i.e., ~0 = kerF s ⊂ kerF s−1 ⊂
· · · ⊂ kerF 0 = FLq . Then it is possible to find subspaces Π1, . . . ,Πs, such that ∩i∈VΠi = ~0 for all V ⊆ [1 : s]
where |V| ≥ 2 and they also satisfy
Π1 ⊕ kerF 1 = FLq ,
Π2 ⊕Π1 ⊕ kerF 2 = FLq ,
...
Πs ⊕ · · · ⊕Π1 ⊕ kerF s = FLq (12)
where “⊕” is the direct sum of two disjoint subspaces. Moreover for i ∈ [1 : s] we have dim Πi = rankF i −
rankF i−1. For more clarification, Figure 2 demonstrates the proposition.
In our proposed achievability scheme, Alice uses superposition coding where she creates a vector
XA[t] = XA,1[t] + · · ·+XA,s[t], (13)
such that XA,i[t] ∈ Πi. Because of (12), {Π1, . . . ,Πs} form a basis for FLq so every vector XA[t] ∈ FLq can be
uniquely decomposed as (13). Now each XA,i[t] ∈ Πi can be considered as a vector that is transmitted by Alice
and will be received independently by each trusted terminal or Eve with erasure probability θi =
∑i−1
j=0 δi. Note
that the vector XA,i[t] is correctly received by the rth receiver only if Sr ≥ i.
So we may view the broadcast channel from Alice to the rest of terminals as s independent packet erasure
channels; where Πi is the set of messages transmitted over the ith channel (layer) and the erasure probability of
the ith channel is θi.
Then we can proceed as follows. On the kth layer, we run independently the scheme propose in [4], [19] for
the secret key sharing problem over an erasure broadcast channel (see also Appendix A for more details). Then,
we can state the following result.
9Theorem 7. The achievable SKG rate of the above scheme for each layer k is given by Rdetk = (1−θk)θk dim(Πk) log q.
So for the total achievable secrecy rate we have
Rdets =
s∑
i=1
θi(1− θi) dim (Πi) log q
=
s∑
i=1
[rankF i − rankF i−1] θi(1− θi) log q.
Observe that this matches the upper bound stated in Theorem 6, and therefore yields a characterization of the
group key-agreement rate for deterministic channels, i.e., this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 3. This result can be easily extended to the asymmetric case where the channels to the legitimate users are
not statistically identical (but still independent). Moreover, notice that the key-generation rate is the same for any
m ≥ 2. This is in fact similar to the erasure channel case [4] (see also Appendix A), where the critical difference
between m = 2 and m > 2 is that the key-reconciliation necessitated the use of ideas from NC.
VI. GROUP SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER STATE-DEPENDENT GAUSSIAN BROADCAST CHANNELS
In this section, by using the results derived in the previous sections, we will study the secret key generation
capacity among multiple terminals having access to a state-dependent Gaussian broadcast channel. We will derive
upper and lower bounds for the secret key generation capacity. Although, the proposed bounds are not matched in
general, we will show that they will match in the high-dynamic range, high-SNR regime in a degree of freedom
sense.
A. Upper Bound for the Key Generation Capacity
In order to upper bound the secrecy capacity for the Gaussian broadcast channel, we cannot apply the result of
Theorem 5 directly because this result has been derived under the assumption that the transmitted and received
symbols are discreet. However, the work in [12] has extended the results of [8] for continuous channels. So by
using [12, Theorem 3.2], we can write an upper bound for the secrecy capacity similar to Theorem 4 with the
addition of a power constraint over the transmitted symbols. Then we can state the following result, as stated in
Theorem 8.
Theorem 8. The key generation capacity of the Gaussian broadcast channel given in (4) using public discussions
is upper bounded as follows
Cgauss ≤
1
2
L
s∑
i=0
s∑
j=0
δiδj log
(
1 +
hiPmax
1 + hjPmax
)
. (14)
Proof: Using [12, Theorem 3.2] and by proceeding similar steps to the proof of Theorem 5 (see Appendix B),
we can write
Cgauss ≤ min
j∈[1:m−1]
sup
PX0 :
E[‖X0‖2]≤LPmax
I(X0;Xj |XE)
(a)
= sup
PXA :
E[‖XA‖2]≤LPmax
I(XA;XB|XE),
where (a) is true because of the symmetry. Hence, there exists an input distribution PXA such that E
[‖XA‖2] ≤
LPmax where the secrecy capacity is upper bounded as follows
Cgauss ≤ I(XA;XB|XE)
= I(XA; XˆB, SB|XˆE, SE)
= H(XˆB, SB|XˆE, SE)−H(XˆB, SB|XˆE, SE, XA)
(a)
= H(XˆB, SB|XˆE, SE)−H(XˆB, SB|XA)
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= H(XˆB, SB|XˆE, SE)−H(SB|XA)−H(XˆB|SB, XA)
(b)
= H(XˆB, SB|XˆE, SE)−H(SB)−H(ZB)
= H(XˆB, XˆE|SE, SB) +H(SE, SB)−H(XˆE, SE)−H(SB)−H(ZB)
= H(XˆB, XˆE|SE, SB)−H(XˆE|SE)−H(ZB).
where (a) is true since we have the Markov chain XB ↔ XA ↔ XE and (b) follows from the fact that the state
variables are independent of XA and given XA and SB the only uncertainty left in XˆB is that of noise ZB. Now
the above relation can be more simplified as follows
Cgauss ≤
s∑
i=0
s∑
j=0
δiδjH(XˆB, XˆE|SE = j, SB = i)−
s∑
k=0
δkH(XˆE|SE = k)−H(ZB)
=
s∑
i=0
s∑
j=0
δiδjH(
√
hiXA + ZB,
√
hjXA + ZE)−
s∑
k=0
δkH(
√
hkXA + ZE)−H(ZB)
=
s∑
i=0
s∑
j=0
δiδjH(
√
hiXA + ZB|
√
hjXA + ZE)−H(ZB)
(a)
≤
s∑
i=0
s∑
j=0
δiδj
2
log
[
(2pie)L × det
(
cov(
√
hiXA + ZB|
√
hjXA + ZE)
)]
−H(ZB), (15)
where (a) follows from the fact that for a fixed variance, Gaussian distribution maximizes the entropy.
The inequality (a) in (15) is achieved when (
√
hiXA + ZB|
√
hjXA + ZE) has a Gaussian distribution. A
sufficient condition for this to be satisfied is when XA, ZB, and ZE are Gaussian and independent, namely,
XA ∼ N(~0, PmaxIL), ZB ∼ N(~0, IL), and ZE ∼ N(~0, IL). This observation makes the calculation of
1
2
log
[
(2pie)L det
(
cov(
√
hiXA + ZB|
√
hjXA + ZE)
)]
much easier as it is equivalent to the evaluation of H(
√
hiXA +ZB,
√
hjXA +ZE)−H(
√
hjXA +ZE) when XA,
ZB, and ZE are Gaussian and independent as shown below,
1
2
log
[
(2pie)L det
(
cov(
√
hiXA + ZB|
√
hjXA + ZE)
)]
=
= H
(√
hiXA + ZB,
√
hjXA + ZE
)−H(√hjXA + ZE)
=
L∑
k=1
H
(√
hiXA,k + ZB,k,
√
hjXA,k + ZE,k
)−H(√hjXA,k + ZE,k)
=
L
2
[
log
(
(2pie)2(1 + hiPmax + hjPmax)
)− log (2pie(1 + hjPmax))],
where E
[
X2A,k
]
= Pmax and E
[
Z2B,k
]
= E
[
Z2E,k
]
= 1 for all k ∈ [1 : L].
Hence, the upper bound on the secrecy capacity reads as follows
Cgauss ≤
s∑
i=0
s∑
j=0
δiδjL
2
log
[
(2pie)2(1 + hiPmax + hjPmax)
]− s∑
i=0
s∑
j=0
δiδjL
2
log [2pie(1 + hjPmax)]− L
2
log(2pie)
=
1
2
L
s∑
i=0
s∑
j=0
δiδj log
(
1 +
hiPmax
1 + hjPmax
)
,
where we are done.
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B. Lower Bound for the Key Generation Capacity
Before stating our achievability scheme, let us first define a “nested message set, degraded channel” wiretap
scenario.
Definition 3. Assume a wiretap channel scenario where there is a transmitter called Alice who broadcasts XA and
there are s+1 receivers Yi where the ith receiver receives Yi according to the broadcast channel (XA, p(y0, . . . , ys|x),Y0×
· · · × Ys)) such that
p(y0, . . . , ys|xA) = p(ys|xA) · p(ys−1|ys) · · · p(y0|y1).
Suppose that Alice has s messages W1, . . . ,Ws where Wi ∈ {1, . . . , 2LRi} and Wi ∼ Uni([1 : 2LRi ]). The goal
is that she wants to broadcast these messages such that ∀i:
(i) each message Wi should be decodable by the receivers Yi, . . . , Ys with a negligible error probability, and
(ii) all the receivers Y0, . . . , Yi−1 should be ignorant about the message Wi, namely for the leakage rate we should
have
R
(L)
leak,i ,
1
L
I(Wi+1, . . . ,Ws;Y
1:L
i ) ≤ L,∀i ∈ [0 : s]. (16)
Now suppose that a multi-receiver wiretap scenario as defined in Definition 3 consists of s + 1 independent
Gaussian channels where the rth channel is defined as follows
Yr[t] =
√
hrX[t] + Zr[t], ∀r ∈ [0 : s], (17)
where Zr[t] ∼ N(0, 1) and hr are some fixed constant representing the channel gains such that h0 < · · · < hs. We
also assume that the channel input is subject to an average power constraint Pmax, i.e., 1L
∑L
t=1 E
[
X2[t]
] ≤ Pmax.
Then we can state the following result.
Theorem 9. Using a properly designed layered wiretap code similar to [3], [5], we can achieve the following set
of rates for the “nested message set, degraded Gaussian wiretap channel,”
Ri =
1
2
[
log
(
1 +
hiPi
1 + hiIi
)
− log
(
1 +
hi−1Pi
1 + hi−1Ii
)]
, (18)
∀i ∈ [1 : s], where Ii ,
∑s
j=i+1 Pj .
Proof: In the following, we will describe a code construction that achieves the rates stated in Theorem 9.
Because it is very similar to [3] and also due to space limit, we only present a sketch of the proof for the theorem.
Assume that the code has s layers that correspond to each channel where they are indexed from 1 up to s (the
channel Y0 should decode nothing). To each layer a power constraint Pi is assigned such that
∑s
i=1 Pi ≤ Pmax. The
transmitter uses superposition coding to encode each message Wi that corresponds to layer i; namely, it broadcasts
X[t] =
s∑
i=1
Xi[t],
over the channel described by (17). Then by receiving Yr, the rth receiver uses successive decoding, that starts
from the layer 1 to decode X1 assuming the rest of the layers as noise and subtracting X1 from the received vector
after decoding. Then it continues this process to decode the rest of layers.
More precisely we construct s codebooks Cˆi(2LRˆi , L) each contains 2LRˆi codewords XLi of length L by choosing
in total L2LRˆi symbols independently from the Gaussian distribution N(0, Pi) where
Rˆi =
1
2
log
(
1 +
hiPi
1 + hiIi
)
,
and Ii =
∑s
j=i+1 Pj . Each codebook Cˆi, 0 < i ≤ s, is divided into 2LRi bins where
Ri =
1
2
[
log
(
1 +
hiPi
1 + hiIi
)
− log
(
1 +
hi−1Pi
1 + hi−1Ii
)]
.
At every layer i, each message is mapped into one bin, and one codeword in the bin is randomly chosen. So, layer
i can transmits 2LRi messages. Following a similar argument as stated in [3], [5], it can be shown that the above
codebook satisfies the requirement of Definition 3.
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Remark 4. Note that all of the above discussions are also valid for complex channels. The only difference is that
there will be no 12 coefficient before rates given by (18) and other expressions should be updated accordingly.
Now, as described in the proof of Theorem 9, by using a properly designed layered coding for the nested message
set, degraded channel wiretap scenario, we can convert the Gaussian channel given in (4) to a set of s independent
erasure channels where the erasure of the messages for each channel (layer) depends on the receiver channel state.
In fact using the layered coding scheme for the wiretap channel, we mimic the orthogonality behaviour that we
have for the deterministic channel as described by (6) and (12).
To be more specific, we assume that Alice broadcasts an L-length vector
XA[t] =
s∑
i=1
XA,i[t],
where she maps Wi (the messages corresponding to the ith layer) to XA,i[t] according to the codebook described
in the proof of Theorem 9. From the proof we know that the receiver r which observes the channel state Sr = i
can decode messages up to layeri and is ignorant about messages of layers above i. So, equivalently, we can say
that the message Wi experiences erasure probability θi =
∑i−1
j=0 δj , when it passes through the channel (4).
Now for each layer i, we run the interactive secret key sharing scheme introduced in [4], [19] (see also see
Appendix A) where Alice broadcasts an n-length sequence of random messages, i.e., Wni . Then, by discussing
over the public channel, the trusted terminals reconcile their secret messages to build a common key. The key
generation rate for each layer is ∆iLRi, so for a fixed power allocation we achieve the following secrecy rate
Rgauss ≤
s∑
i=1
∆iLRi,
where Ri is defined in (18) and ∆i = (1− θi)θi.
The maximum secrecy rate is obtained by optimizing the above rate over the power allocations {Pi}si=1. Thus
we can write
Rgauss =

max
∑s
i=1 ∆iLRi
subject to
∑s
i=1 Pi ≤ Pmax
Pi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [1 : s].
(19)
Because R1 is an increasing function of P1 when other Pi are kept fixed and Ri does not depend on P1 for i > 1
we can write the power constant inequality as an equality. We also apply a change of variables to Problem 19 from
{Pi} to {Ik}. So we can rewrite (19) in the canonical form (see [20]) as follows
Rgauss =
{
min −∑si=1 ∆iLRi
subject to −[Ik−1 − Ik] ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : s],
(20)
where for convenience we define I0 , Pmax, Is , 0, and we have also
Ri =
1
2
log
(
1 + hiIi−1
1 + hiIi
· 1 + hi−1Ii
1 + hi−1Ii−1
)
.
In Section VII, we will focus on solving the optimization problem (20).
VII. SOLVING THE NON-CONVEX POWER ALLOCATION PROBLEM
Here, we present how the optimization problem (20) can be solved. Our final result is not in closed form but
instead we propose a recursive algorithm (i.e., a dynamic program) that finds all the possible solutions of KKT5
conditions (which provide necessary conditions for an optimal solution to the optimization problem (20)) and find
an optimum solution by searching among them. By using the proposed algorithm, we reduce the search space of
the optimization problem (20) from a multi-dimensional continuous space to a finite elements set; i.e., the set of
solutions to the KKT conditions. In this sense, the final result is exact (the proposed algorithm is not a numerical
5Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (e.g., see [20]).
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Variable Definition
θk (∀k ∈ [1 : s]) The effective erasure probability that the message Wk (message of kth layer) experience which is
∑k−1
i=0 δi.
∆k (∀k ∈ [1 : s]) A dummy variable which is θk(1− θk).
Ik (∀k ∈ [0 : s]) The contribution of the interference of all layers above k to the decoding of the kth layer which is
∑s
i=k+1 Pi.
For convenience we define I0 = Pmax and Is = 0.
hk (∀k ∈ [0 : s]) The square of channel gains. Remember that h0 < · · · < hs.
λk (∀k ∈ [1 : s]) The Lagrangian multipliers of optimization problem (20).
αk (∀k ∈ [1 : s− 1]) = (hk+1 − hk)∆k+1.
βk (∀k ∈ [1 : s− 1]) = (hk − hk−1)∆k.
{I∗k}sk=0 With an abuse of notation denotes any solution to the set of KKT conditions stated in (21).
{I∗∗k }sk=0 The optimum power allocation of the optimization problem (20) that also satisfies (21).
r
(1)
k (∀k ∈ [0 : s]) The root of the numerator of F (1)(x) defined in (23). Note that we define r(1)0 , Pmax and r(1)s , 0.
r
(2)
k,1, r
(2)
k,2 The real roots (if exist) of the numerator of F
(2)(x) defined in (24).
TABLE I: Explanation for some of the important variables.
approximation), but it is hard to describe the solution in a single closed form equation for all possible parameters
involved in the secrecy problem (e.g., channel gains, probability distribution over states, etc.). However, note that
for each set of given problem parameters, it is possible to state the final solution in terms of these given parameters
(but here we only focus on deriving the final “value” of the solution, not its “expression”). To find the optimal
solutions of the above-mentioned optimization problem, we proceed as follows.
Because the constraints of optimization problem (20) are affine, we can use the KKT conditions to derive a set
of necessary conditions for the optimum power allocation (e.g., see [21, Chapter 5]). By defining the Lagrangian
L as
L(P1, . . . , Ps, λ1, . . . , λs) = −
s∑
i=1
∆iLRi +
s∑
i=1
λi[Ii − Ii−1],
and applying the KKT theorem (e.g., see [20, Chapter 5]), we write a set of necessary conditions for the optimal
solution of (20) as follows 
∂L
∂Ik
= 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : s− 1],
λk[Ik − Ik−1] = 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : s],
Ik ≤ Ik−1, ∀k ∈ [1 : s],
λk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : s].
(21)
By taking the derivative of L with respect to Ik, ∀k ∈ [1 : s− 1], and doing some algebra we get
0 =
∂L
∂Ik
=
(hk+1βk − hk−1αk)Ik − (αk − βk)
(ln 2)(1 + hk−1Ik)(1 + hkIk)(1 + hk+1Ik)
+ (λk − λk+1)
= F
(1)
k (Ik) + (λk − λk+1), (22)
where αk , (hk+1 − hk)∆k+1, βk , (hk − hk−1)∆k and F (1)k (Ik) is defined accordingly. Notice that because
Ik’s are positive variables the denominator of F
(1)
k (Ik) is strictly positive. For the ease of reference, some of the
important variables of our problem are gathered in Table I.
The main idea of our proof is to propose a recursive algorithm that first finds all the solutions of the KKT
equations (21), (with an abuse of notation) each is denoted by {I∗k}sk=0. Then among these solutions finds the one
that maximizes the secrecy rate given by (20), which is denoted by {I∗∗k }sk=0.
To this end, in every iteration, the proposed algorithm picks some k (for that I∗k is not determined yet) and then
determine the sign of F (1)k (x) (or as will be discussed later, for some cases determine the sign of F
(2)
k (x) which
will be defined in (24)). Then using (22) (or in some cases using (24)) in addition to the complementary slackness
condition, it determines whether we have to examine the following three cases: (i) I∗k = I
∗
k−1, (ii) I
∗
k = I
∗
k+1, or
(iii) the value of I∗k is determined in this iteration. Hence, at the end of each iteration the size of the optimization
problem is reduced by one (either I∗k is determined in this iteration or is equal to the I
∗
k−1 or I
∗
k+1). Ignoring the
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details for a moment, we can repeat the above procedure until all values of I∗k are determined. These sets of I
∗
k ’s
are the solutions to the KKT conditions (21).
Considering more details, we can proceed as follows. First, let r(1)k to be the root of the numerator of F
(1)
k (x)
(assuming hk+1βk − hk−1αk 6= 0), namely,
r
(1)
k ,
αk − βk
hk+1βk − hk−1αk , ∀k ∈ [1 : s− 1], (23)
and by convention set r(1)0 , Pmax and r
(1)
s , 0. Then we can observe the following different situations, as stated
in Case 1.
Case 1 (Linear Case6). Based on different values of problem parameters, for each k ∈ [1 : s− 1], we have various
cases for a solution I∗k that satisfies (21) as follows:
(1) If hk+1βk − hk−1αk = 0 (which means that the numerator of F (1)k (x) is a constant and r(1)k is not defined),
then because of the ordering over channel gains we should have αk > βk. Now, because of (22) and since λk’s are
non-negative, we should have λ∗k > 0 which by using the complementary slackness condition leads to I
∗
k = I
∗
k−1.
This is equivalent to P ∗k = 0.
(2) If αk < βk then we get hk+1βk > hk−1αk, so we have r
(1)
k < 0 and F
(1)
k (x) > 0 for x ≥ 0. Because of
(22), we conclude that λ∗k+1 > 0 which by using the complementary slackness condition results in I
∗
k = I
∗
k+1, i.e.,
P ∗k+1 = 0.
(3) If hk+1βk < hk−1αk we can conclude that αk > βk so we have r
(1)
k < 0 and F
(1)
k (x) < 0 for x ≥ 0. Because
of (22), we conclude that λ∗k > 0 which by using the complementary slackness condition results in I
∗
k = I
∗
k−1, i.e.,
P ∗k = 0.
(4) If αk > βk and hk+1βk > hk−1αk then we have r
(1)
k > 0. Moreover, we have F
(1)
k (x) > 0 for x > r
(1)
k and
F
(1)
k (x) < 0 for x < r
(1)
k . Now, there exists the following different cases:
(a) If Pmax < r
(1)
k then we have F
(1)
k (x) < 0 for x ≤ Pmax. From (22), we conclude that λ∗k > 0 which leads to
I∗k = I
∗
k−1, i.e., Pk = 0.
(b) If 0 < r(1)k ≤ Pmax then we have F (1)k (x) < 0 for x < r(1)k and F (1)k (x) > 0 for x > r(1)k . Now I∗k can be
equal to r(1)k without any further requirement. However, if we have r
(1)
k < I
∗
k then we should have I
∗
k = I
∗
k+1.
Similarly if we have I∗k < r
(1)
k then we have to have I
∗
k = I
∗
k−1.
The above different cases are derived under the assumption that we do not have any extra information about a
solution {I∗k}. In particular, prior to solving the KKT conditions, we do not know whether we have I∗k = I∗k±l (for
some valid k and l) or not. Note that due to the ordering on the optimal solution I∗k ’s imposed by (20), if we have
I∗k = I
∗
k+l then we should also have I
∗
k = I
∗
k+1 = · · · = I∗k+l.
Now suppose that, by some mean (e.g., from the previous iterations of our proposed algorithm for finding the
solutions of KKT equations (21)), we know that I∗k = I
∗
k+l. This knowledge enables us to reduce the size of the
optimization problem (20). Notice that after having this information, the derivative of the Lagrangian L with respect
to Ik is not given by (22) anymore. More precisely, let us assume that I∗k = I
∗
k+l. Then, taking the derivative of L
with respect to Ik and by doing some algebra, we can write
0 =
∂L
∂Ik
=
∆k(1 + hk+lIk)(1 + hk+l+1Ik)(hk − hk−1)
(ln 2)(1 + hk−1Ik)(1 + hkIk)(1 + hk+lIk)(1 + hk+l+1Ik)
− ∆k+l+1(1 + hk−1Ik)(1 + hkIk)(hk+l+1 − hk+l)
(ln 2)(1 + hk−1Ik)(1 + hkIk)(1 + hk+lIk)(1 + hk+l+1Ik)
+ (λk − λk+l+1)
= F
(2)
k (Ik) + (λk − λk+l+1). (24)
Notice that for all values of l ∈ [1 : s − k], the numerator of F (2)k (Ik) is a quadratic function in Ik and the
denominator is strictly positive for Ik ≥ 0 because hk’s are positive real quantities.
Similar to the Case 1, here in this case, we can also find the real roots r(2)k,1 and r
(2)
k,2 of the numerator of F
(2)
k (x)
and find the sign of the function F (2)k (x) for different values of x ∈ [0, Pmax] based on the place of these roots.
6Here by the linear case, we mean that the numerator of F (1)k (Ik) in (22) is a linear function of Ik.
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Hence, based on the real roots of the numerator of F (2)k (x), we can write a set of different conditions similar to
Case 1, as stated in Case 2.
Case 2 (Quadratic Case7). Here, we do not write all the different possibilities for (24) because the idea is very
similar to Case 1. Instead, we explain the main part of the procedure in the following. In general, based on the
position of the roots of numerator of F (2)k (x), we can potentially have up to five different cases. To clarify the
method, for example, consider the situation where the numerator of F (2)k (x) has two distinct real roots r
(2)
k,1 < r
(2)
k,2
where r(2)k,1, r
(2)
k,2 ∈ [0, Pmax]. Then we have to consider the following five different cases for the solution I∗k : (1)
I∗k ∈
[
0, r
(2)
k,1
)
, (2) I∗k = r
(2)
k,1, (3) I
∗
k ∈
(
r
(2)
k,1, r
(2)
k,2
)
, (4) I∗k = r
(2)
k,2, and (5) I
∗
k ∈
(
r
(2)
k,2, Pmax
]
. In the items (1), (3),
and (5) one can find the sign of F (2)k (x) in the corresponding interval and based on that determine whether we
should have I∗k = I
∗
k−1 or I
∗
k = I
∗
k+l+1.
Remark 5. It is worth to emphasize that the structure of the optimization problem (20) is such that the denominator
of F (1)k (x) and F
(2)
k (x) are always strictly positive for x ≥ 0. Moreover, the numerator of F (1)k (x) is always at
most a linear function of x and that of F (2)k (x) is always at most a quadratic function in x. This fact significantly
simplifies finding the solutions of KKT equations (21) and hence solving the optimization problem (20).
The above discussion for different possible cases based on the numerator roots of F (1)k and F
(2)
k can be applied
to any specific instance of the optimization problem (20). As briefly explained before, the main idea is to apply a
recursive algorithm that finds the set of solutions of (21) iteratively by determining variables Ik’s one by one. This
procedure can also be considered as reducing the size of the optimization problem (20) (i.e., number of states) by
one in every iteration.
To better explain our proposed method, we present the pseudo code of our algorithm in Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2. For more clarification, in addition to the comments inside the pseudo code, the important variables
of the pseudo code are explained separately in Table II.
Putting it together, we can describe our algorithm as follows (see also Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2). First,
Algorithm 1 initializes a data structure d(i) for each i ∈ [0 : s] which contains the required information about I∗i
(see Lines 1 to 8 of Algorithm 1). Then it calls Algorithm 2 that is a recursive function.
Starting from the original KKT conditions, at every iteration, Algorithm 2 picks a number k (such that Ik is
not determined yet) and apply Case 1 or Case 2 (depending if it is linear or quadratic case) to that particular Ik
(see Lines 3, 6 and 16 of Algorithm 2). By doing so, the size of the original KKT conditions (i.e., number of
undetermined variables Ik) is reduced by one and we may have up to five (in fact up to three if Case 1 holds and
up to five if Case 2 holds) new set of KKT conditions to be solved.
Now, we can repeat the above process on each of these new set of conditions and go forward iteratively (see
Lines 13 and 23 of Algorithm 2). This procedure is like discovering a tree starting from some point as root (the
root is determined by the first k ∈ [1 : s − 1] picked up by the algorithm). Note that many of these new set of
conditions do not lead to valid solutions that satisfy the original KKT conditions (21). This will be determined later
as the algorithm proceeds by observing some contradictions on the intervals of Ik’s. This process continues until
we obtain problems of zero size (that have all variable Ik’s determined and satisfy the original KKT conditions
(21); Line 29 of Algorithm 2) or at some point in the middle of the algorithm the determined Ik’s up to that point
violate the KKT conditions (so this particular branch will be discarded; Lines 12 and 22 of Algorithm 2).
The above-mentioned algorithm enables us to find all of the solutions to KKT conditions (21). Then because
the KKT equations provide a necessary condition on the optimal solution, it is sufficient to check among all of
the solutions of KKT equations to find the optimal power allocation for the optimization problem (20) (Line 10 of
Algorithm 2). Consequently, the search space of the original optimization problem is reduced from the continuous
space Rs−1 to a set of size at most 5s−1 elements. Note that this is the worst case analysis and in practice the size
of the set can be much smaller than this number8.
7Here by the quadratic case, we mean that the numerator of F (2)k (Ik) in (24) is a quadratic function of Ik.
8In the examples discussed in the following, the number of solutions is something like 2 or 3.
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Variable Description
d(i) An array that contains the available information about the solution I∗ of (21) at every step of the algorithm.
At the beginning, we have i ∈ [0, s]. However, the size of the problem becomes smaller in every iteration.
d(i).l and d(i).u Lower and Upper bounds on the indices of states such that we have I∗d(i).l = · · · = I∗d(i).u.
d(i).min and d(i).max Determine the interval that I∗k ’s belongs to, i.e., I
∗
k ∈
[
d(i).min, d(i).max
]
where k ∈ [d(i).l : d(i).u].
d(i).determined Let k = d(i).l. If the value of I∗k is completely determined, we have d(i).determined = “true” otherwise it
is equal to “false”.
SolSet A set that at the end of the algorithm contains all of the solutions (data structures d) that satisfy the KKT
conditions (21).
TABLE II: Description of the important variables in Algorithms 1 and 2.
Algorithm 1 Finding all of the solutions that satisfy KKT conditions (21).
Require: s, {hi}si=0, {∆k}sk=1, Pmax
1: for all i ∈ [0 : s] do . Initialization
2: d(i).l = d(i).u = i . In general we may have I∗d(i).l = · · · = I∗d(i).u
3: d(i).min = 0 . Initializing the lower bound on I∗i
4: d(i).max = Pmax . Initializing the upper bound on I∗i
5: d(i).determined = false . At the beginning, the value of I∗i is not determined
6: end for
7: d(0).min = Pmax; d(0).determined = true . Also part of the initialization
8: d(s).max = 0; d(s).determined = true . Also part of the initialization
9: SolSet = RECURSION(d, {hi}si=0, {∆k}sk=1)
10: For all I ∈ SolSet find the one which maximizes the achievable rate R; call it I∗∗
11: return I∗∗
12: end
In the following, in Lemma 1 and in Section VII-A, we present two special cases for the optimization problem
(20) that is insightful.
Lemma 1. Consider the set of {r(1)k }sk=0 as defined in (23). If we have 0 = r(1)s < r(1)s−1 < · · · < r(1)1 < r(1)0 = Pmax,
then the KKT conditions given by (21) have a unique solution. Moreover, the optimal power allocation is determined
by I∗∗k = r
(1)
k for all k ∈ [1 : s− 1].
Proof: For the proof of this lemma refer to Appendix B.
As an example, based on the above discussions, for the case of having 3 states (s = 2) the solution of the power
allocation can be simplified as presented in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. If s = 2 then based on the values of channel coefficients and probability distribution over the states,
we have the following result for the optimal power allocation:
1) if α1 < β1 then we have P ∗∗1 = Pmax,
2) if h2β1 < h0α1 then P ∗∗2 = Pmax, and finally
3) if α1 > β1 and h2β1 > h0α1 then P ∗∗2 = min
(
r
(1)
1 , Pmax
)
where r(1)1 is defined in (23).
A. High-dynamic range, high-SNR regime
In this section, we show that our proposed achievability scheme, stated in Section VI-B, is optimal for the “high-
dynamic range, high-SNR regime” in a degrees of freedom sense. We first give a formal definition of degrees of
freedom in our setup as follows. The degrees of freedom for secret key sharing over a state dependent Gaussian
broadcast channel is defined as
DoFs = lim
Q→∞
Cgauss
1
2 logQ
where hi = Qγi for i ∈ [0 : s], γi > 0 and γi > γi−1.
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Clearly, as Q→∞, hi  hi−1 (high-dynamic range) and hi  1 (high-SNR). The following theorem completely
characterizes DoFs, and hence proves the optimality of our proposed achievability scheme in the high-dynamic
range and high-SNR regime.
Theorem 10. The degrees of freedom (DoFs) for secret key sharing over a state dependent Gaussian broadcast
channel is given by: DoFs = L
∑s
i=1 (γi − γi−1) ∆i.
Proof: We prove the theorem in two steps. First, we show a lower bound on DoFs using the proposed
achievability scheme in Section VI-B, and then we show a matching upper bound on DoFs using the upper bound
on the secret key generation capacity as stated in Theorem 8.
Lower bound on DoFs: If hi  hi−1 for all i, we have r(1)i ·= Q−γi . Then the ordering condition stated in
Lemma 1 is satisfied and as a result we have I∗∗i = r
(1)
i . Using this observation, we can derive a lower bound on
DoFs as shown below,
DoFs
(a)
≥ lim
Q→∞
L
∑s
i=1 ∆i
(
1
2 log
(
1+hir
(1)
i−1
1+hir
(1)
i
· 1+hi−1r(1)i
1+hi−1r
(1)
i−1
))
1
2 logQ
= L
s∑
i=1
∆i (γi − γi−1) (25)
where (a) follows from hi  hi−1 and Lemma 1.
Upper bound on DoFs: An upper bound on DoFs can be derived as shown below,
DoFs
(a)
≤ L
∑
i>j
δiδj (γi − γj)
= L
s∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=0
i∑
k=j+1
(γk − γk−1) δiδj
(b)
= L
s∑
k=1
s∑
i=k
k−1∑
j=0
(γk − γk−1)δiδj
= L
s∑
k=1
∆k(γk−1 − γk)
where (a) follows from Theorem 8 and (b) follows by exchanging the order of the summations. The above upper
bound on DoFs matches the lower bound in (25) and this completes the proof of the theorem.
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Algorithm 2 The recursive core part of the algorithm that is called by Algorithm 1.
1: function RECURSION(d,{hi}si=0, {∆k}sk=1)
2: SolutionSet = ∅
3: Find an index j such that d(j).determined = false
4: if there is such j then
5: k = d(j).l
6: if d(j).l = d(j).u then . Linear case (I∗k 6= I∗k+1)
7: Find the root r(1) of the numerator of F (1)k (x) defined in (23)
8: Based on the value of r(1), break the interval [d(j).min, d(j).max] if necessary
9: for all possible subinterval of the interval [d(j).min,d(j).max] do
10: Find the sign of F (1)k (x) in this subinterval
11: According to the sign of F (1)k (x) (and based on Case 1), update d(j).l, d(j).u, d(j).min,
d(j).max, and d(j).determined, but to a new data structure d′
12: if d′ is consistent up to this point then . if ∀i we have d′(i).min ≤ d′(i).max
13: SolutionSet← SolutionSet ∪ RECURSION(d′, {hi}si=0, {∆k}sk=1)
14: end if
15: end for
16: else . Quadratic case
17: Find the roots r(2)1 and r
(2)
2 of the numerator of F
(2)
k (x)
18: Based on the values of r(2)1 and r
(2)
2 , break the interval [d(j).min, d(j).max] if necessary
19: for all possible subinterval of the interval [d(j).min,d(j).max] do
20: Find the sign of F (2)k (x) in this subinterval
21: According to the sign of F (2)k (x), update d(j).l, d(j).u, d(j).min, d(j).max, and
d(j).determined, but to a new data structure d′
22: if d′ is consistent up to this point then . if ∀i we have d′(i).min ≤ d′(i).max
23: SolutionSet← SolutionSet ∪ RECURSION(d′, {hi}si=0, {∆k}sk=1)
24: end if
25: end for
26: end if
27: else . If all d(j)’s are determined
28: if the found solution is consistent then . if ∀i we have d(i).min ≤ d(i+ 1).min
29: SolutionSet = {d}
30: end if
31: end if
32: return SolutionSet
33: end function
B. Numerical Evaluations
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of the secret key sharing scheme proposed in Section VII
for a few examples and compare it with the upper bound stated in Theorem 8.
Example 1. Consider a setup with 3 states (s = 2) where h0 = −5dB, −5dB < h1 < 30dB and h2 = 30dB.
The probability distribution across the states is assumed to be uniform. Figure 3 shows the achievable rate and the
upper bound as a function of h1 with the following choices of Pmax: (a) Pmax = 0.01 and (b) Pmax = 10. Clearly,
there is a gap between the upper bound and the achievable rate. As it is mentioned before, the proposed scheme
is not optimal in an absolute sense, but only in a degrees of freedom sense as proved in Section VII-A.
Example 2. Consider a setup with 4 states where h0 = −5dB, h3 = 30dB, h1 = min[g1, g2] dB and h2 =
max[g1, g2] dB where −5dB < g1, g2 < 30dB. The probability distribution across the states is assumed to be
uniform. Figure 4 shows the achievable rate and the upper bound as a function of g1 and g2 with Pmax = 10.
Similar to Example 1, this illustrates the absolute gap between the upper bound and the achievable rate.
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Fig. 3: The achievable rate and the upper bound as a function of h1 with Pmax: (a) Pmax = 0.01, (b) Pmax = 10
(see Example 1).
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Fig. 4: The achievable rate (lower surface) and the upper bound (upper surface) as a function of g1 and g2 with
Pmax = 10 in a setup with 4 equiprobable states (see Example 2).
Example 3. Consider a setup with 36 (equiprobable) states, uniformly spaced in the range −5dB to 30dB (i.e.,
hi = (−5 + i)dB, i ∈ [0 : s]). Figure 5 shows the fraction of Pmax allocated to each state by the proposed scheme
for Pmax ∈ {0.1, 1, 10, 100}.
The above examples illustrate different aspects of the proposed scheme: the gap with respect to the upper bound
and the distribution of power across the states. In general, these aspects depend on the setup parameters. For a
given setup, the numerical implementation of our proposed scheme can be used for efficient evaluations, even with
a large number of states (e.g., 36 states in Example 3).
VIII. DISCUSSION, OPEN QUESTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Here, in this section we bring forward discussion about multi-party secret key sharing problem, open questions
and possible future directions.
First, the SKG capacity problem among multiple terminals over a state-dependent Gaussian channel in the
presence of a passive eavesdropper is still unsolved. But, the optimality of the proposed multi-party secret key
sharing scheme has been shown for deterministic channels (that includes the erasure channels as a special case).
By having intuition from this result, the achievability scheme for the Gaussian state-dependent channel is based on
the message level erasure, simulated by using the wiretap code. However, in our outer bound on the SKG capacity,
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Fig. 5: Fraction of Pmax allocated to each layer by the proposed scheme as explained in Example 3.
we do not have such an assumption and this can be a reason explains the gap between our achievability scheme
and outer bound.
Similar ideas used in this work for the secret key sharing problem over erasure channels can also be applied for
the secret communication over these channels, e.g., see [22]. However, in our work, we go beyond and used these
ideas to propose a coding scheme for multi-terminal secret key sharing over the Gaussian state-dependent broadcast
channel (in the presence of public discussion). On the other hand, this is still open whether the same connection
can be obtained between secret communication over erasure and state-dependent Gaussian channels or not.
In our achievability scheme, we use public channel to send feedback from all the receivers to Alice. However,
it is worth mentioning that although the public channel is available and without cost, we use it to communicate
only the channel state which is a limited feedback; but not to transmit all the output feedback. Hence, it is possible
to adopt our protocol to use ACK/NAK (e.g., similar to [19]) instead of public channel. However, the resulting
protocol maybe not optimal even for the deterministic channels.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that this thread of work is not pure theoretical and there have been some
attempts to implement these ideas (e.g., see [16], [17], [18], [19]). As an example, [19] reports to create shared
secret key in a test-bed containing 5 nodes at rate 10 kbit/sec, with their secrecy being independent of the adversary’s
computational capabilities.
APPENDIX A
GROUP SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER ERASURE BROADCAST CHANNELS
In this appendix, we characterize the secret key generation capacity among multiple terminals communicating
over an erasure broadcast channel. More precisely we prove the following result.
Theorem 11 ([4]). The secret key generation capacity among m terminals that have access to an erasure broadcast
channel is given by
Cerss = (1− δ)δE (L log q) ,
where δ is the erasure probability from Alice to the rest of terminals and δE is the erasure probability from Alice
to Eve. It worth to mention that the capacity Cerss does not depend on m.
The converse part of Theorem 11 is a direct corollary of Theorem 6 assuming that we have only two states; i.e.,
complete erasure and complete reception. The achievability part is stated in Section A-A.
A. Lower Bound for the Key Generation Capacity
Here we describe and analyse our proposed achievability scheme for the secret key generation over erasure
broadcast channels. The proposed scheme achieves secrecy rate that matches the upper bound derived from
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Fig. 6: Here, we use Bob and Calvin to denote for T1 and T2, respectively. The sets N{B},N{C}, and N{B,C} are
shown for the case where m = 2. For this case we have N ∗ = N{B} ∪N{C} ∪N{B,C}.
Theorem 6. Moreover, the complexity of this scheme is polynomial in the packet length L and block length
n. The proposed scheme consists of several phases and it proceeds as follows.
Private Phase:
1) Alice broadcasts n packets, x1, . . . , xn, where xi ∈ FLq and xi ∼ Uni
(
FLq
)
(we will call them “x-packets”).
Of these, n∗ packets are received by at least one honest node. This set is denoted by N ∗ where n∗ = |N ∗|.
Public Discussion (Initial Phase):
1) Each honest node sends Alice publicly a feedback message specifying which x-packets it received. Let Ii
denotes the set of packets’ indices received by the ith terminal where i ∈ [1 : m− 1].
2) Alice constructs h = δE ·n∗ linear combinations of the x-packets, y1, . . . , yh (we will call them “y-packets”),
as follows:
(i) She divides the set N ∗ of x-packets that were received by at least one honest node into non-overlapping
subsets, such that each subset consists of all the packets that were commonly received by a different subset
of honest nodes. To be more precise, let S be an arbitrary non-empty subset of [1 : m− 1] and let us define
the set
NS ,
{
i ∈ [1 : n] | i ∈ Ij : ∀j ∈ S, and i /∈ Ij : ∀j ∈ S
}
.
Then we have
N ∗ =
⋃
∅6=S⊆[1:m−1]
NS .
Figure 6 shows all the sets NS , ⊆[1 : 2] for the case where m = 2.
(ii) From each such subset of packets NS , she creates δE · nS linear combinations using the construction
described in Lemma 3 (provided in Appendix A-B), where nS , |NS |. Then she publicly reveals the
coefficients she used to create all the y-packets.
3) Each node i ∈ [1 : m − 1] reconstructs as many (say hi) of the y-packets as it can (based on the x-packets
it received in step #1). For hi we can write
hi =
∑
∅6=S⊆[1:m−1]: i∈S
δE · nS .
Note that as n grows we have hi → E [hi] which is equal to E [hi] = (1 − δ)δEn. Up to this point of the
protocol, and assuming that n is large enough, for each subset S ⊆ [1 : m−1] the terminals in the set S∪{0}
have created a common secret key (which is secure with high probability) of length δEnS among themselves.
Public Discussion (Reconciliation Phase):
1) Alice creates h − mini hi linear combinations of the y-packets (we will call them “z-packets”), using the
construction provided in Lemma 4 (provided in Appendix A-B). She publicly reveals both the contents and
the coefficients of the z-packets, such that each node i receives at least h− hi of them.
2) Each node i combines the h− hi z-packets it received with the hi y-packets it recreated in phase 1, and
reconstructs all the y-packets.
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3) Alice creates l = mini hi linear combinations of the y-packets, k1, . . . , kl (we will call them “k-packets”),
using the construction stated in Lemma 5 (provided in the Appendix A-B). She publicly reveals the coefficients
she used to create all the k-packets.
4) Each node i reconstructs all the k-packets. The common secret key is the concatenation of all the k-packets,
K = {k1, . . . , kl}.
Now, based on Definition 1, we summarize the above achievability scheme as follows. At t = 0 Alice generates
the random variable Q0 = {x1, . . . , xn} where xi ∼ Uni
(
FLq
)
. We have also Q1:m−1 = ∅. For each time t,
1 ≤ t < n, she broadcasts X0[t] = xt and there is no public discussions afterwards; namely we have D[t] = ∅.
After the nth transmission by Alice there is a public discussion in many rounds; summarized as follows. We have
D[n] = (P1, P2, P3, P4) where P1 denotes the set of indices Ii that have been sent back by the honest terminals, P2
denotes the coefficients of the y-packets, P3 denotes the z-packets and their coefficients, and finally P4 represents
the coefficients of k-packets.
The performance of the proposed protocol in terms of the secret key generation rate, is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 12. The achievable secret key generation rate of the above scheme is
Rerss = (1− δ)δE (L log q) .
It is noteworthy to mention that the achievable rate does not depend on the number of terminals m.
Proof: The way that the achievability scheme is proposed, constructively satisfies Condition (1), i.e., we have
P [Ki 6= Kj ] = 0, ∀i, j ∈ [0 : m− 1], i 6= j.
To prove Condition (3), we proceed as follows. First, let us define l , l/n. Then we can write
H(K) = H(K, l) = H(K|l) +H(l)
≥ H(K|l)
= H(K|α < l < β) · P [α < l < β]+H(K|l ≥ β) · P [l ≥ β]+H(K|l ≤ α) · P [l ≤ α]
≥ H(K|α < l < β) · P [α < l < β]
≥ nα (L log q)
[
1− P [l ≤ α]− P [l ≥ β]],
where µ = (1− δ)δE and also α = µ− γ and β = µ+ γ for some small γ such that 0 < γ ≤ µ. Now by applying
the concentration result of Lemma 6 (see Appendix A-B), we have
P
[
l ≤ α] ≤ m exp(− γ2
2µ
n
)
, a,
and
P
[
l ≥ β] ≤ exp(−mγ2
3µ
n
)
, b.
Hence, observe that by choosing
Rerss = µ(L log q)
and
 = µ (L log q) [a+ b] + γ (L log q) [1− a− b]
we have Condition (3) satisfied, i.e., 1nH(K) > R
ers
s − . Finally, we get the desired result by making γ arbitrarily
small because we have → 0 if γ → 0.
To prove Condition (2), we need to show that
I(K;XnE , P1, P2, P3, P4) < .
By using a similar technique used above to bound H(K), (more precisely by using Lemma 3 and some concentration
results for nS), it can be shown that
I(Y ;XnE , P1, P2) <  (26)
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where Y is a random variable representing the y-packets. Using Lemma 5, by construction, we have also
I(K;P3, P4) = 0. (27)
Now we know that the coefficients of the z-packets and k-packets form a basis (see Lemma 5) so the random
variable Y and the random variable (K,P3, P4) are equivalent (having one we have the other). Then we can write
(26) as follows
I(Y ;XnE , P1, P2) = I(K,P3, P4;X
n
E , P1, P2)
= I(P3, P4;X
n
E , P1, P2) + I(K;X
n
E , P1, P2|P3, P4) < ,
so
I(K;XnE , P1, P2|P3, P4) < . (28)
Now we can expand
I(K;XnE , P1, P2, P3, P4) = I(K;P3, P4) + I(K;X
n
E , P1, P2|P3, P4),
where the first term is zero by (27) and second term is very small because of (28). This concludes the theorem.
Theorem 12 in addition to the upper bound derived from Theorem 6, complete the proof of Theorem 11.
B. Some Lemmas
Lemma 3. Consider a set of n packets x1, . . . , xn, xi ∈ FLq , where xi ∼ Uni
(
FLq
)
and all the packets xi are
independent from each other. Assume that Eve has overheard nE of these packets. Call the packets Eve has
w1, . . . , wnE . Then it is possible to create n
′ = n − nE linear combinations of the x1, . . . , xn packets over the
finite field Fq, say y1, . . . , yn′ , in polynomial time, so that these n′ new y-packets are secure from Eve, i.e.,
I(y1, . . . , yn′ ;w1, . . . , wnE) = 0. (29)
The same result holds with high probability (of order 1−O(q−1)) if the linear combinations are selected uniformly
at random over Fq.
Proof: Let X be an n × L matrix that has as rows the packets x1, . . . , xn. Similarly, construct matrices Y
and W that have as rows the packets y1, . . . , yn′ and w1, . . . , wnE .
Note that because the packets w1, . . . , wnE are by definition a subset of the packets x1, . . . , xn, we can write
W = AEX , with AE ∈ FnE×nq that has zeros and ones as elements. We can also write the y-packets as linear
combinations of the x-packets over the finite field Fq. We will then have that Y = AX , where A ∈ F(n−nE)×nq is
the matrix we are interested in designing. Thus we can write[
Y
W
]
=
[
A
AE
]
X.
We now proceed by expanding H(Y |W ). We have
H(Y |W ) = H(Y ,W )−H(W )
=
[
rank (B)− rank(AE)
]
L log q
=
[
rank (B)− nE
]
L log q,
where B =
[
A
AE
]
and L is the length of each packet xi. Now the only way that we have H(Y |W ) = H(Y ) is
that B becomes a full rank matrix.
Using coding theory, we will construct such a matrix B, without knowing AE. All we know is that in each row
of AE there is only one “1” and the remaining elements are zero; so all of the vectors in the row span of AE have
Hamming weight less than or equal to nE. Now, if we choose A to be a generator matrix of an maximum distance
separable (MDS) linear code with parameters [n, n−nE, nE + 1]q then each codeword has Hamming weight larger
than or equal to nE + 1 (e.g., see [23]). So the row span of A and AE are disjoint (except for the zero vector) and
the matrix B becomes full-rank for all of matrices AE that have the aforementioned structure. For example, we
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may select to use a generator matrix of a Reed-Solomon code (e.g., see [23]), which is an MDS code, over a field
of size q = n+ 1.
To prove the second assertion of the lemma, we note that creating vectors yi uniformly at random is equivalent
to selecting the elements of matrix A independently and uniformly at random from the field Fq. In this case we
can write
P [B is full-rank] =
(qn − qnE) · · · (qn − qn−1)
qn(n−nE)
=
(
1− q−(n−nE)
)
· · · (1− q−1)
= 1−O(q−1), (30)
which goes to 1 as q increases.
Lemma 4. Consider packets y1, . . . , yh, yi ∈ FLq , and assume that each one of m − 1 receivers (apart from T0)
has observed a different subset of these packets, i.e., the ith receiver observes a subset of size hi packets. Then, we
can find h− l (where l = mini hi) linear combinations of the y-packets, say z1, . . . , zh−l such that, each receiver
can use its observations (of y-packets) and the z-packets to recover all of the y-packets.
Proof: This is a standard problem formulation in the NC literature, and any of the standard polynomial-time
approaches for network code design can be used (e.g., see [24]).
Lemma 5. Consider a set of h packets y1, . . . , yh where yi ∼ Uni
(
FLq
)
and assume that an eavesdropper Eve has
overheard h− l linear combinations of these packets. Call the packets Eve has z1, . . . , zh−l. Then it is possible to
create l linear combinations of the y1, . . . , yh packets, say k1, . . . , kl, in polynomial time, so that these are secure
from Eve, i.e.,
I(k1, . . . , kl; z1, . . . , zh−l) = 0.
The same result holds with high probability (probability of order 1 − O(q−1)) if the l packets ki are created
uniformly at random over Fq.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 3, let Y , Z and K be matrices that have as rows the packets y1, . . . , yh,
z1, . . . , zh−l and k1, . . . , kl. We can then write [
K
Z
]
=
[
AK
AZ
]
Y ,
where AZ is a given known matrix, since we know the transmitted linear combinations, and we seek a matrix AK
such that, the matrix
[
AK
AZ
]
is full rank. Equivalently, we seek vectors k1, . . . , kl that together with z1, . . . , zh−l
form a basis; we can do this using any of standard methods, such as Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization.
Lemma 6. The value of the parameter l in Theorem 12, which is defined to be l = mini hi converges exponentially
fast in n to its expected value.
Proof: Let us consider the random variables h, hi, and l defined in Section A-A. For convenience, we work
with the normalized random variables h , h/n, hi , hi/n, and l , l/n. Let us also define the random variables
η
(i)
j , i ∈ [1 : m− 1] and j ∈ [1 : n] as follows
η
(i)
j =

1 if the jth x-packet is received
by Ti but not by Eve,
0 otherwise.
Then we can write hi = 1n
∑n
j=1 η
(i)
j and we have µ = µi , E
[
hi
]
= (1− δ)δE . As defined before, we have also
l = mini hi.
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To bound l, observe that for some small γ, 0 < γ ≤ µ, we can write
P
[
l ≥ µ+ γ] = P [hi ≥ µ+ γ : ∀i]
= P
[
h1 ≥ µ+ γ
]m
≤ exp
(
−mγ
2
3µ
n
)
,
where in the last inequality we use Chernoff bound [25, Chapter 4]. On the other hand we can also write for
0 < γ ≤ µ
P
[
l ≤ µ− γ] ≤ mP [h1 ≤ µ− γ]
≤ m exp
(
− γ
2
2µ
n
)
,
so we are done.
APPENDIX B
SOME PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 5: First, notice that we can write
H(X[0:m−1]|XE) (a)=
m−1∑
j=0
H(Xj |XE, X[0:j−1])
(b)
= H(X0|XE) +
m−1∑
j=1
H(Xj |X0),
where (a) follows from the chain rule and (b) follows from the independence of the channels. Similarly, for every
B ( [0 : m− 1] we can expand H(XB|XBc , XE) as follows
H(XB|XBc , XE) = H(X0|XBc , XE) +
∑
j∈B
H(Xj |X0).
Now, from Theorem 4, we know that for every λ ∈ Λ([0 : m− 1]) there exists a distribution PX0 such that Cs is
upper bounded by
Cs ≤ H(X[0:m−1]|XE)−
∑
B([0:m−1]
λBH(XB|XBc , XE)
= H(X0|XE) +
m−1∑
j=1
H(Xj |X0)−
∑
B([0:m−1]
λB
H(X0|XBc , XE) +∑
j∈B
H(Xj |X0)

(a)
= H(X0|XE)−
∑
B([0:m−1], 0∈B
λBH(X0|XBc , XE) +
m−1∑
j=1
H(Xj |X0)−
m−1∑
j=1
H(Xj |X0)
∑
B([0:m−1], j∈B
λB
(b)
= H(X0|XE)−
∑
B([0:m−1], 0∈B
λBH(X0|XBc , XE)
(c)
=
∑
B([0:m−1], 0∈B
λBI(X0;XBc |XE),
where in (a) we have changed the order of summation over j and B, and (b) and (c) follows from (8). So up to
here we have the following upper bound for the secret key generation rate
Cs ≤ max
PX0
min
λ∈Λ([0:m−1])
∑
B([0:m−1], 0∈B
λBI(X0;XBc |XE).
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Now, let us define i = arg minj∈[1:m] I(X0;Xj |XE). Then, notice that λB = λBc = 1 where Bc = {i} is a valid
choice according to the condition of Theorem 4, i.e., they satisfy (8). Hence, for this choice of λ, the upper bound
for Cs is simplified to
Cs ≤ max
PX0
min
j∈[1:m−1]
I(X0;Xj |XE)
≤ min
j∈[1:m−1]
max
PX0
I(X0;Xj |XE).
Proof of Lemma 1: From Case 1, we know that r(1)k > 0 only if αk > βk and hk+1βk > hk−1αk. So as
mentioned before ∀k ∈ [1 : s− 1] we have F (1)k (x) > 0 for x > r(1)k and F (1)k (x) < 0 for x < r(1)k .
Now, it can be easily checked that the solution I∗k = r
(1)
k satisfies the set of conditions stated in (21) with λ
∗
k = 0.
On the other hand, because F (1)k (x) > 0 for x > r
(1)
k and F
(1)
k (x) < 0 for x < r
(1)
k , we show that every deviation
of I∗k from the r
(1)
k results in a violation of KKT conditions (21). To this end, we proceed as follows.
Let us fix k. If I∗k > r
(1)
k then F
(1)
k (I
∗
k) > 0 and because we should have F
(1)
k (I
∗
k) + (λ
∗
k − λ∗k+1) = 0, we can
conclude that λ∗k+1 > 0. So by the complementary slackness condition given in (21), we should have I
∗
k = I
∗
k+1.
Now, two cases may happen. First, if I∗k+1 < r
(1)
k that results in a contradiction because we have already assumed
that I∗k > r
(1)
k and we have also I
∗
k = I
∗
k+1. Secondly, if I
∗
k+1 > r
(1)
k > r
(1)
k+1, then similar to the above argument
we can show that I∗k+1 = I
∗
k+2. Then we either encounter a contradiction in this step or have to continue. Finally,
if we did not have any contradiction in these steps we would have I∗k = I
∗
k+1 = · · · = I∗s = 0. Now, this is a
contradiction because we had assumed I∗k > r
(1)
k > r
(1)
s = 0.
Similarly, it is possible to argue that for the case I∗k < r
(1)
k we will also encounter a contradiction. So the unique
solution to the set of conditions (21) is given by I∗k = r
(1)
k and λ
∗
k = 0 and we are done.
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